336pp., maps, paperback, Cambridge, 2019

Yonatan L. Morse on the different ways autocrats compete in and manipulate elections. Based on case studies of Tanzania, Cameroon, and Kenya, as well as broader comparisons from Africa.

"Why do some authoritarian regimes enjoy genuine electoral support, while others resort to electoral manipulation and repression to stay in power? In this sophisticated analysis of contemporary authoritarian regimes, Yonatan L. Morse attributes variation in autocrats' electoral strategies to both the legacies of institution building and to the nature of international patronage. Morse's account is rich in nuance and firmly rooted in African politics, yet provides generalizable lessons that will be of interest to scholars of comparative politics and international relations alike." Daniela Donno, University of Pittsburgh

"This ambitious, imaginative and well written book has a great deal to tell us about how authoritarians give themselves an unfair electoral advantage - and so keep themselves in power - in Africa. We need to understand that authoritarians have gone from refusing to hold elections to finding new ways to rig them, and this book provides essential insights about how and why this has happened." Nic Cheeseman, University of Birmingham and author of How to Rig an Election

Yonatan L. Morse is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Connecticut.

HOW AUTOCRATS COMPETE, parties, patrons and unfair elections in Africa

: Morse (Y.)

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